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Lippman v. City of Oakland, A141865

Writ of mandate:

"A traditional writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 is a method for compelling a public entity to perform a legal and usually ministerial duty." (American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Metropolitan Water District (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 247, 261.)

“In reviewing a trial court’s judgment on a petition for writ of ordinary mandate, . . . we exercise our independent judgment on legal issues, such as the interpretation of statutory . . . provisions.” (Kreeft v. City of Oakland (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 46, 53.)

In interpreting a statute, “we begin as always with the fundamental premise that the objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent."  To discover that intent we first look to the words of the statute, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning. Where the words of the statute are clear, we may not add to or alter them to accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the face of the statute or from its legislative history. (Trope v. Katz (1995) 11 Cal.4th 274, 280.)

(Cal. Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, filed Dec. 22, 2017, Cert. for Pub. Jan. 22, 2018, Lippman v. City of Oakland, A141865).

La base légale du writ of mandate.

T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation, S233898

Misrepresentation (California law): Duty of care: Warning: Product warning: Failure to warn: Strict liability: Negligence: Sophisticated user & intermediary defenses: Tort:

Under our state’s law, there is no per se requirement in negligent misrepresentation actions that the misrepresentation be made by the product

manufacturer. Consider Hanberry v. Hearst Corp. (1969) 276 Cal.App.2d 680, where the plaintiff alleged that defective shoes caused her injuries. (Id. at p. 682.) The Court of Appeal allowed the negligent misrepresentation claims to go forward against a nonmanufacturer — the publisher of Good Housekeeping magazine, which had given the shoes its renowned seal of approval. (Id. at p. 683.) This seal appeared not only in the pages of its own magazine, but was used by the shoe manufacturer in its advertising as well as on the product and its packaging. (Ibid.) The court acknowledged that the defendant publisher was neither the seller nor the manufacturer of the shoes, but nonetheless recognized a duty of care because of the allegations that the publisher “held itself out as a disinterested third party which had examined the shoes, found them satisfactory, and gave its endorsement”; and the plaintiff reasonably relied on the endorsement and “purchased the shoes because of it.” (Id. at pp. 686, 683.) As to the plaintiff’s claim under strict liability, however, the court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal — declining to extend strict liability “to a general endorser who makes no representation it has examined or tested each item marketed.” (Id. at p. 688; see also Conte, 168 Cal.App.4th at pp. 101-102 [similarly distinguishing between strict liability and negligent misrepresentation theories].)

Novartis suggests that we recently conflated strict liability and negligence in Webb v. Special Electric Co., Inc. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 167 when we observed that "there is little functional difference between the two theories in the failure to warn context." (Id. at p. 187.) Not so. Webb’s observation was merely that the sophisticated user and sophisticated intermediary defenses applied to both theories of liability. (Ibid.) We did not categorically alter our longstanding recognition that “California law recognizes the differences between negligence and strict liability causes of action.” (Johnson v. American Standard , Inc. (2008) 43 Cal. 4th 56, 71; see Saller v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1239 ["Negligence and strict products liability are separate and distinct bases for liability that do not automatically collapse into each other because the plaintiff might allege both when a product warning contributes to her injury"].)

We likewise discount decisions from those jurisdictions that differ from California by categorically excluding from liability certain defendants (see, e.g., Huck v. Wyeth, Inc., 850 N.W.2d at p. 371 (plur. opn. of Waterman, J.) [“the tort of negligent misrepresentation does not apply to sellers of products but rather is limited to those in the business or profession of supplying information for the guidance of others”]) or certain injuries (see, e.g., Flynn v. American Home Products Corp. (Minn.Ct.App. 2001) 627 N.W.2d 342, 351 [“the Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized negligent misrepresentation involving damages only for pecuniary loss, and has expressly declined to recognize the tort of negligent misrepresentation involving the risk of physical harm”]) from the tort of negligent misrepresentation. And we find unhelpful the views of those jurisdictions that (federal courts predict) will recharacterize under their product liability act or similar rule all claims against a product manufacturer, no matter the theory, as product liability actions, which can be asserted only against the manufacturer of the product. (See, e.g., Germain, 756 F.3d at pp. 941-954 [construing the laws of Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Washington, and West Virginia]; Phelps v. Wyeth, Inc. (D.Or. 2012) 857 F.Supp.2d 1114, 1121 [Oregon law]; Stanley v. Wyeth, Inc. (La.Ct.App. 2008) 991 So.2d 31, 33-34 [noting the “numerous cases where the negligent misrepresentation claims were . . . preempted by . . . a state’s enactment of products liability law”].)

We find that brand-name drug manufacturers have a duty to use ordinary care in warning about the safety risks of their drugs, regardless of whether the injured party (in reliance on the brand-name manufacturer’s warning) was dispensed the brand-name or generic version of the drug. We also conclude that a brand-name manufacturer’s sale of the rights to a drug does not, as a matter of law, terminate its liability for injuries foreseeably and proximately caused by deficiencies present in the warning label prior to the sale.

(Cal. S.C., Dec. 21, 2017, T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation, S233898).

Responsabilité civile et contractuelle (droit californien), déclaration inexacte ("misrepresentation") :

En droit californien, une action en dommages-intérêts fondée sur une déclaration inexacte peut être déposée contre d'autres défendeurs que le seul fabricant du produit. Par exemple, dans une procédure où le demandeur soutenait que des chaussures lui avaient causé un préjudice corporel, la cour a accepté comme défendeur un magazine très connu qui avait fait l'éloge de ces chaussures dans l'un de ses articles. La cour a reconnu que le magazine n'était ni le fabricant ni le vendeur des chaussures, mais qu'il était tout de même tenu par un devoir de diligence du fait qu'il s'était présenté comme une tierce partie désintéressée qui avait examiné les chaussures, les avait jugées satisfaisantes, et en avait fait ainsi la promotion. En outre, le demandeur s'était raisonnablement fié à dite promotion, et, du fait de celle-ci, avait acheté les chaussures. Une telle action reste une action en responsabilité pour faute, et non une action en responsabilité causale : le magazine n'a pas suggéré qu'il avait examiné ou testé chacune des chaussures mises sur le marché.

La responsabilité pour faute ("negligence") doit toujours être distinguée des cas de responsabilité objective ("strict liability"), même si un demandeur qui agit en responsabilité du fait des produits invoque ces deux notions juridiques.

La Cour rejette par ailleurs la jurisprudence d'autres états qui exclut catégoriquement la responsabilité pour déclaration inexacte de certains défendeurs (est citée comme exemple une décision d'un autre état qui exclut le vendeur des défendeurs possibles dans le cadre d'une action en responsabilité pour faute du fait d'une déclaration inexacte, et qui ne retient comme défendeurs possibles que ceux dont le métier en lui-même consiste à donner des informations) ou qui limites dite responsabilité à certains types de dommages (par exemple la jurisprudence de certains autres états qui limite au dommage matériel la responsabilité pour déclaration inexacte, et la prohibe s'agissant du préjudice corporel).

Dans la présente espèce, la Cour juge que le fabricant d'un produit pharmaceutique doit aviser des risques de ses produits. Il peut être recherché à cet égard en responsabilité même par un demandeur à qui le générique a été prescrit. Ce devoir d'avis des risques se prolonge même si le fabricant cède ses droits sur le produit.

T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation, S233898

Off-label use: Physicians:

Physicians may, in their professional judgment, prescribe a drug for a purpose other than that for which it has been approved by the FDA. (Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Leg. Com. (2001) 531 U.S. 341, 351, fn. 5 [“‘Off-label use is widespread in the medical community’”].)

(Cal. S.C., Dec. 21, 2017, T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation, S233898).

La prescription "off-label" d'un produit pharmaceutique est admise.

T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation, S233898

Diversity jurisdiction:

(…) Federal court under diversity jurisdiction. Federal courts sitting in diversity are “extremely cautious” about recognizing innovative theories under state law (Combs v. Int’l Ins. Co. (6th Cir. 2004) 354 F.3d 568, 578) and are bound to “apply the applicable state law as it now exists.” (Foster, 29 F.3d at p. 171; see generally Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the Erie Doctrine (2011) 120 Yale L.J. 1898, 1939 [federal courts “pick the narrowest possible answer, usually the one that does the least to change the status quo, regardless of its predictions of what the state court would do”].)

Secondary sources: Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the Erie Doctrine (2011) 120 Yale L.J. 1898, 1939.

(Cal. S.C., Dec. 21, 2017, T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation, S233898).

Quand elles statuent en diversité, les cours fédérales veilleront à appliquer le droit des états dans sa teneur objective, sans chercher à créer de nouvelles théories juridiques.

T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation, S233898

Duty of care: Negligence: Tort:

Duty is indeed the cornerstone of every negligence claim. In California, the general rule governing duty is codified in Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a): “Everyone is responsible . . . for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person . . . .” Thus, “each person has a duty to use ordinary care and ‘is liable for injuries caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the circumstances . . . .’” (Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 456, 472.) Whether a party has a duty of care in a particular case is a question of law for the court, which we review independently on appeal. (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1142 (Kesner).)

The conclusion that a duty exists in a particular case “‘is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.’” (Dillon v. Legg (1968) 68 Cal.2d 728, 734, quoting Prosser, Law of Torts (3d ed. 1964) pp. 332-333.) We invoke the concept of duty to limit “‘the otherwise potentially infinite liability which would follow from every negligent act,’” yet we do so only where public policy clearly supports (or a statutory provision establishes) an exception to the general rule of Civil Code section 1714. (Kesner, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1143.) When considering whether to depart from the general rule, we balance a number of considerations, including “the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.” (Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 113 (Rowland).)

In the context of prescription drugs, a manufacturer’s duty is to warn physicians about the risks known or reasonably known to the manufacturer. (Carlin v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1104, 1112 (Carlin); see generally Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co. (1984) 35 Cal.3d 691, 699-700.) The manufacturer has no duty to warn of risks that are “merely speculative or conjectural, or so remote and insignificant as to be negligible.” (Carlin, at p. 1116.) If the manufacturer provides an adequate warning to the prescribing physician, the manufacturer need not communicate a warning directly to the patient who uses the drug. (Ibid.)

(Cal. S.C., Dec. 21, 2017, T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation, S233898).

Le devoir de diligence est une des conditions centrales de l'obligation de réparer un dommage en responsabilité civile. La Californie l'a codifié à la Section 1714(a) de son Code civil. Le critère est l'exercice d'un devoir de diligence raisonnable compte tenu des circonstances. Déterminer si une partie est tenue par un devoir de diligence dans une situation particulière est une question de droit, que la Cour Suprême de l'état revoit de manière indépendante. Pour résoudre cette question de droit, dite Cour examine les notions de la prévisibilité du dommage causé, de la preuve du dommage, du lien de causalité entre l'acte et le dommage, du reproche moral attaché à l'acte, de la prévention d'un dommage futur, du fardeau qu'une responsabilité ferait porter à l'auteur, des conséquences pour l'ensemble de la communauté qui découleraient d'un jugement reconnaissant une responsabilité, ainsi que de la disponibilité et du coût d'une assurance couvrant le risque examiné.

Dans le domaine des produits pharmaceutiques, le devoir du fabricant est d'avertir la communauté médicale des risques connus ou qui doivent raisonnablement être connus. Si l'avertissement est donné aux médecins, il n'a pas à être donné directement aux patients.

T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation, S233898

Foreseeability (California law), Negligence, Tort:

California law places greater weight on the element of foreseeability in the duty analysis than does Maryland law. Indeed, this state treats foreseeability as “the most important factor” (Kesner, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1145), and we do not narrowly circumscribe the kinds of relationships that must exist between the plaintiff and the defendant as a predicate to imposing a duty on the defendant to prevent injuries arising from its own conduct. (Id. at p. 1163; see Randi W., 14 Cal.4th at p. 1077 [one who negligently provides false information to another can owe a duty of care to a third person “who did not receive the information and who has no special relationship with the provider”].)

We therefore do not find persuasive those out-of-state cases discounting the role of foreseeability (see, e.g., Huck v. Wyeth, Inc., 850 N.W.2d at p. 376 (plur. opn. of Waterman, J.) [“‘foreseeability should not enter into the duty calculus’”]) or requiring the existence of a specific type of relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant (see, e.g., Moretti v. Wyeth, Inc. (9th Cir. 2014) 579 Fed. Appx. 563, 564 [construing negligent misrepresentation, under Nevada law, to “‘require, at a minimum, some form of relationship between the parties’”]; Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc. (10th Cir. 2013) 727 F.3d 1273, 1282 [“Oklahoma courts have also required a relationship between the defendant company and the product at issue for other theories of liability, including negligence”]).

(Cal. S.C., Dec. 21, 2017, T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation, S233898).

Prévisibilité du dommage en responsabilité civile et contractuelle (droit californien) :

Face à la question de savoir si un défendeur répond envers un lésé, le droit californien accorde une importance essentielle à la notion de prévisibilité. Si le défendeur pouvait prévoir qu'un tiers quelconque, dont l'existence pouvait même lui être inconnue, risquait d'être lésé, ce défendeur pourrait être condamné à répondre (l'espèce concerne en particulier l'application de la théorie de la "misrepresentation" dans le contexte pharmaceutique).