Tuesday, July 31, 2018

Hansen v. Newegg.com Americas, Inc., Docket B271477


Competition law: Unfair competition: Advertising: Consumer protection: Price: Origin: Geographic origin: Labeling of origin: Demurrer:

The complaint alleged that Newegg’s website advertised fictitious former price and discount information that was intended to induce customers to purchase its products (…) Hansen further asserted that he would not have purchased the products had he known the “true nature of the discounts.”

Newegg filed a demurrer arguing that Hansen lacked “standing to . . . assert any claim under the FAL, UCL or CLRA” because he had “suffered no loss of money or property as a result of Newegg’s actions.” According to Newegg, Hansen’s complaint showed he had received the “products he wanted for the prices he agreed to pay”; he had not alleged that “the products were different than what he wanted, were unsatisfactory in any way, or were worth less than what he paid for them.” Accordingly, he had suffered no form of “economic injury.”


Summary of Applicable Law:

Unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200) (UCL):
“The UCL’s purpose is to protect both consumers and competitors by promoting fair competition in commercial markets for goods and services.” (Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 939, 949.) “In service of that purpose, the Legislature framed the UCL’s substantive provisions in “broad, sweeping language” and provided ‘courts with broad equitable powers to remedy violations’.” (Kwikset, 51 Cal.4th at p. 320.)


False advertising law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17500 et seq.) (FAL):
“Any violation of the false advertising law . . . necessarily violates the UCL.” (Kasky, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 950.) Section 17500 “proscribes not only advertising which is false, but also advertising which, although true, is either actually misleading or which has a capacity, likelihood or tendency to deceive or confuse the public.” (Colgan v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 663, 679.) Section 17501 specifically limits the use of advertisements that purport to convey the former price of a product: “No price shall be advertised as a former price of any advertised thing, unless the alleged former price was the prevailing market price . . . within three months next immediately preceding the publication of the advertisement or unless the date when the alleged former price did prevail is clearly, exactly and conspicuously stated in the advertisement.” As used in section 17501, the term “‘former price’ . . . includes but is not limited to the following words and phrases when used in connection with advertised prices; ‘formerly –,’ ‘regularly –,’ ‘usually –,’ ‘originally –,’ ‘reduced from ___,’ ‘was ___ now ___,’ ‘___% off.’” (4 Cal. Code Regs., § 1301.) (…) Our Legislature has adopted multiple statutes that specifically prohibit the use of deceptive former price information and misleading statements regarding the amount of a price reduction. (See § 17501; Civ. Code, § 1770, subd. (a)(13).) These statutes make clear that, contrary to Newegg’s assertions, our Legislature has concluded “reasonable people can and do attach importance to a product’s former price in their purchasing decisions.” (Kwikset, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 333 [statutory prohibition on use of deceitful “Made in U.S.A.” labels shows that reasonable consumers do rely on that form on information]; see also id. at p. 329 [Legislature’s prohibition on deceitful Made in the U.S.A. labels demonstrates “the materiality of this representation”].) As noted in Hinojos, this conclusion is supported by empirical research showing that the presence of a higher original price affects consumers’ perceptions “about the product’s worth,” and increases their willingness to buy the product. (Hinojos, 718 F.3d at p. 1106.)


Consumers Legal Remedies Act (Civ. Code, § 1750 et seq.) (CLRA)
The CLRA makes unlawful . . . various “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices undertaken by any person in a transaction intended to result or which results in the sale or lease of goods or services to any consumer.” The CLRA sets forth 27 proscribed acts or practices. (Civ. Code, § 1770, subd. (a)(1)-(27).) (Veera v. Banana Republic, LLC (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 907, 915 (Veera).) One of those “proscribed acts” is “making false or misleading statements of fact concerning . . . the existence of, or amounts of, price reductions.” (Civ. Code, § 1770, subd. (a)(13).)


(Examples: are prohibited: To some consumers, processes and places of origin matter.  In particular, to some consumers, the ‘Made in U.S.A.’ label matters. (Kwikset, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 328-329.) The Court noted that the “Legislature had recognized the materiality of this form of representation by specifically outlawing deceptive and fraudulent ‘Made in America’ representations.” (Id. at p. 329 (citing § 17533.7) [prohibiting deceitful representations that a product was “Made in the U.S.A.”] and Civ. Code, § 1770, subd. (a)(4) [prohibiting deceptive representations of geographic origin].) (…) the Legislature has also specifically prohibited false former price advertising, as it did false labeling of origin. (See § 17501, Civ. Code, § 1770, subd. (a).)


(…) Kwikset, however, held that a consumer’s decision to pay more for a product than he or she would have but for the misrepresentation is itself a form of economic injury: In the eyes of the law, a buyer forced to pay more than he or she would have is harmed at the moment of purchase.


(…) The Supreme Court has concluded that to establish standing under California’s UCL and FAL, a consumer need only allege that he or she relied on a misrepresentation when purchasing the product, and that he or she would not have purchased the product but for the representation. (Kwikset, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 317.)


(California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, July 31, 2018, Hansen v. Newegg.com Americas, Inc., Docket B271477, Certified for Publication, Acting P.J. Zelon)


Le demandeur soutient que le site Internet de l’entreprise défenderesse contenait des prix avant rabais qui ne correspondaient pas à la réalité, dans l’intention d’inciter le consommateur à l’achat. Il allègue en outre que sans cette publicité, il n’aurait pas acheté de produits à la défenderesse.

Celle-ci soutient pour sa part que la demande doit être rejetée d’entrée de cause, le demandeur n’ayant pas subi de dommage économique : les allégués de la demande démontreraient que le demandeur aurait reçu les produits qu’il voulait pour des prix qu’il avait consenti à payer, sans prétendre avoir reçu d’autres produits, des produits défectueux, ou de moindre valeur que la somme effectivement payée.

Cette affaire est jugée en application du droit californien, et les dispositions topiques sont les suivantes :

Loi contre la concurrence déloyale (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200) : il est rappelé ici que la loi utilise des formulations non restrictives, attribuant ainsi aux Tribunaux des compétences de décision étendues.

Loi contre la publicité mensongère (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17500 et seq.) : toute violation de dite loi implique nécessairement violation de la loi contre la concurrence déloyale. Dite loi proscrit non seulement la publicité mensongère, mais aussi la publicité qui ne l’est pas mais qui a la capacité, la possibilité, ou la tendance de tromper ou d’induire en erreur le public. La Section 17501 de la loi limite spécifiquement la publicité d’un ancien prix : un ancien prix ne peut pas apparaître, sauf si cet ancien prix correspondait au prix du marché dans les trois mois antérieurs à la publicité, ou sauf si la publicité indique clairement la date à laquelle l’entreprise pratiquait effectivement cet ancien prix.
Le législateur a considéré que dans sa décision d’achat, le consommateur attachait de l’importance à l’ancien prix.

La loi « consumers legal remedies » (Civ. Code, § 1750 et seq.) : dite loi consacre l’illicéité de diverses méthodes déloyales ou trompeuses, soit avec l’objectif de vendre (biens ou services), soit qui résultent effectivement en une vente (biens ou services). La loi décrit 27 pratiques illicites. L’une de ces pratiques consiste à déclarer de manière fausse ou trompeuse des faits relatifs à l’existence ou au montant d’une réduction de prix. D’autres pratiques consistent notamment à tromper quant à l’origine géographique d’un produit.


Antitrust: Price fixing: Wages


FTC Act §5: Unfair competition: Antitrust: Price fixing (wages or fees paid to workers): Labor law (wages): Human resource:
Illegal for competitors to agree to fix wages or fees paid to workers in order to drive wages down.
FTC
Bureau of Competition
July 31, 2018
Republication
FTC File No. 171-0134

“Just as it is illegal for competitors to agree to fix prices on the products they sell in order to drive prices up, it is illegal for competitors to agree to fix wages or fees paid to workers in order to drive wages down,” said Bruce Hoffman, Director of the Bureau of Competition. “All workers are entitled to competitive wages and the FTC will enforce the antitrust laws against any companies that agree not to compete for workers, or to attempt to drive down workers’ wages. Fortunately, in cooperation with the Texas Attorney General’s office, we were successful in stopping this conduct quite quickly. We will aggressively investigate any other instances in which companies engage in this type of behavior, and we will seek relief commensurate with the conduct, the harm to workers, and—where appropriate—any ill-gotten benefits received by the firms engaged in the illegal activities.”

According to the complaint, the two owners agreed to lower their therapist pay rates to the same level and also invited several of their competitors to lower their rates in an attempt to keep therapists from switching to staffing companies that paid more. The complaint alleges that they entered into the agreement after learning that a home health agency planned to pay significantly lower rates to the therapist staffing companies for therapist services.

The complaint charges Your Therapy Source and the two owners with violating Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act by unreasonably restraining competition to offer competitive pay rates to therapists; fixing or decreasing pay rates for therapists; and depriving therapists of the benefits of competition among therapist staffing companies.

In October 2016, the FTC and the Department of Justice issued Guidance for Human Resource Professionals for tips on how to avoid antitrust risks associated with agreements among competing employers to fix wages. That guidance, which is available on the FTC website, outlines steps businesses can take to comply with the antitrust laws in recruiting and retaining employees.

The FTC will publish the consent agreement package in the Federal Register shortly. The agreement will be subject to public comment for 30 days, beginning today and continuing through Aug. 30, 2018, after which the Commission will decide whether to make the proposed consent order final. Comments can be filed electronically or in paper form by following the instructions in the “Supplementary Information” section of the Federal Register notice.


ANALYSIS OF AGREEMENT CONTAINING
CONSENT ORDER TO AID PUBLIC COMMENT
In the Matter of Your Therapy Source, LLC; Neeraj Jindal; and Sheri Yarbray
FTC File No. 171-0134


FTC and DOJ Release Guidance for Human Resource Professionals on How Antitrust Law Applies to Employee Hiring and Compensation:



Monday, July 30, 2018

Counterfeiting


Customs: Counterfeiting:


Last year, CBP launched a major ad campaign – Fake Goods, Real Dangers – and a companion webpage containing information about the downsides of purchasing counterfeit goods.
CBP also collaborates with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Homeland Security Investigations (ICE-HSI) and 21 other partners at the National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center to ensure a comprehensive response to intellectual property theft.
If you have information concerning counterfeit merchandise illegally imported into the United States, CBP encourages you to submit an anonymous report through the e-Allegations Online Trade Violation Reporting System.

Republication
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, July 30, 2018

Tuesday, July 24, 2018

OTR Wheel Engineering, Inc. v. West Worldwide Services, Inc., Docket No. 16-35897


Evidence: Clear and convincing evidence: Preponderance of the evidence:

Clear and convincing evidence requires greater proof than preponderance of the evidence. To meet this higher standard, a party must present sufficient evidence to produce ‘in the ultimate factfinder an abiding conviction that [the asserted factual contentions are] highly probable.’ Sophanthavong v. Palmateer, 378 F.3d 859, 866–67 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984)).

(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, July 24, 2018, OTR Wheel Engineering, Inc. v. West Worldwide Services, Inc., Docket No. 16-35897, J. Clifton, for publication)

Le degré de la preuve en procédure civile fédérale. « Clear and convincing evidence » : les moyens de preuve présentés doivent rendre le fait à prouver « hautement probable ».

OTR Wheel Engineering, Inc. v. West Worldwide Services, Inc., Docket No. 16-35897


Judgment as a matter of law: Jury: Waiver:

Rule 50 governs the timing of a motion for judgment as a matter of law. Pursuant to Rule 50(a), a “motion for judgment as a matter of law may be made at any time before the case is submitted to the jury.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(2). If the court does not grant the motion, Rule 50(b) allows a party to file a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law after the judgment is entered. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). But “failing to make a Rule 50(a) motion before the case is submitted to the jury forecloses the possibility of considering a Rule 50(b) motion.” Tortu v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 556 F.3d 1075, 1083 (9th Cir. 2009).

Likewise, a “party cannot raise arguments in its post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) that it did not raise in its pre-verdict Rule 50(a) motion.” Freund v. Nycomed Amersham, 347 F.3d 752, 761 (9th Cir. 2003). Such arguments are also waived for purposes of appeal. See Farley Transp. Co. v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 786 F.2d 1342, 1345 (9th Cir. 1985). In his Rule 50(a) motion, West argued that OTR had failed to prove that West removed the Outrigger mark from tires in commerce. West did not mention Dastar or the likelihood of confusion. Thus, these arguments would normally be waived.

But if a party fails to object to a Rule 50(b) motion on the basis of waiver, then the party waives its waiver defense. Graves v. City of Coeur D’Alene, 339 F.3d 828, 838–39 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Where a defendant does not object to an improperly-filed Rule 50(b) motion, and does not raise the issue of default for failure to abide Rule 50(a) before the trial court, then the procedural flaw in the Rule 50(b) motion is waived . . . .”)


(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, July 24, 2018, OTR Wheel Engineering, Inc. v. West Worldwide Services, Inc., Docket No. 16-35897, J. Clifton, for publication)


Règle 50 de procédure civile fédérale : la requête en jugement « as a matter of law » peut être déposée en tout temps, mais avant que le cas ne soit soumis au Jury (Règle 50(a)). Si la cour rejette la requête, la partie peut la renouveler après jugement (Règle 50(b)). Mais si la requête n’a pas été déposée avant soumission du cas au Jury, la partie ne pourra pas la déposer après jugement.
Par ailleurs, le requérant ne peut rien alléguer/invoquer dans sa requête 50(b) qui n’ait pas été allégué/invoqué dans sa requête 50(a). Mais si la partie adverse omet de se prévaloir d’une requête 50(b) qui contient des éléments étrangers à la requête 50(a), la cour ne relèvera pas le défaut d’office et une décision sera rendue s’agissant de ces éléments.

OTR Wheel Engineering, Inc. v. West Worldwide Services, Inc., Docket No. 16-35897


Trademark: Registration requirement: Trade dress:

If a trademark is not registered, then a plaintiff may still assert a claim for infringement of its protectable trade dress right, but that plaintiff bears the burden to establish distinctiveness and non-functionality. Talking Rain, 349 F.3d at 603. Thus, if a mark is cancelled, a claim for infringement may still be pursued based on an unregistered mark. Dep’t of Parks & Recreation for State of Cal. v. Bazaar Del Mundo Inc., 448 F.3d 1118, 1131 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Far Out Prods., Inc. v. Oskar, 247 F.3d 986, 997 (9th Cir.2001)). In other words, fraud on the PTO “does not affect the mark’s validity, because a trademark need not be registered to be enforceable.” Specialized Seating, Inc. v. Greenwich Industries, LP, 616 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2010); cf. J. Thomas McCarthy, 6 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 31:60 (5th ed. 2018). Thus, if a defendant establishes that a mark was obtained through fraud on the PTO, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to establish distinctiveness and non-functionality. See Tie Tech, 296 F.3d at 783; see also Talking Rain, 349 F.3d at 603. The plaintiff always maintains the burden to establish consumer confusion.

(…) OTR argues that it pled an unregistered trade dress claim by asserting a claim under section 43 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125. It was not enough to simply cite section 43, however, because that section covers both registered and unregistered marks. GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1204 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The provision at issue here—§ 43—protects against infringement of unregistered marks and trade dress as well as registered marks.” (citing Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 150 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir.1998)). OTR’s reference to section 43 did not by itself signal an unregistered trade dress claim.

(…) We pause to note that OTR’s unregistered claim was only precluded to the extent that it asserted a broader claim than the registered claim. As noted above, registration only provides a presumption of validity, shifting the burden to the defendant to rebut either distinctiveness or non-functionality. Tie Tech, 296 F.3d at 783. If a registration is cancelled, for example, due to fraud on the PTO, then the claim survives but becomes more difficult to prove. See Bazaar Del Mundo Inc., 448 F.3d at 1131. Perhaps appreciating that fact, OTR argues that its unregistered claim encompassed “something more” than what was covered by the registered claim. OTR describes that “something more” as the OTR tire’s “overall appearance, including the sidewall and its relationship to the road.” To assert this broader claim, however, OTR was required to clearly plead the claim in the complaint, and it did not.

Secondary sources: J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 31:60 (5th ed. 2018).


(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, July 24, 2018, OTR Wheel Engineering, Inc. v. West Worldwide Services, Inc., Docket No. 16-35897, J. Clifton, for publication)

Droit des marques. Trade dress (terme juridique qui se rapporte à des caractéristiques de l'aspect visuel d'un produit ou de son emballage, donnant une indication de l'origine du produit aux consommateurs). Une action en violation de la marque peut être déposée même si elle n’est pas enregistrée, ou peut être maintenue même si l’enregistrement est annulé. Il en va de même en cas d’action en violation de la présentation (protégée) du produit associé à la marque (trade dress). 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (Section 43 du Lanham Act) (false designations of origin, false descriptions, and dilution forbidden), peut être invoqué que la marque soit ou non enregistrée.
L’action en violation d’une marque qui n’est pas enregistrée pose davantage de problèmes de preuve que dans le cas d’une marque enregistrée. Le sachant, le demandeur dans l’action en violation d’une marque enregistrée doit veiller à alléguer la violation de l’ensemble des caractères liés à la marque, même ceux qui ne ressortent pas de l’enregistrement : de la sorte, si l’enregistrement est considéré comme invalide, le demandeur aura maintenu la possibilité d’alléguer la violation des caractéristiques qui exorbitent l’enregistrement.


Associated Management Services, Inc. v. Ruff, Case Number DA 17-0102, Cit. 2018 MT 182


Tortious interference with business relations: Prospective economic advantage:

The essential elements of tortious interference with business relations or prospective economic advantage are: (1) an intentional act or conduct by the alleged tortfeasor; (2) performed by the tortfeasor “without right or justifiable cause”; (3) performed for the purpose of causing damage or loss to another; and (4) resulting damages. Maloney v. Home & Inv. Ctr., Inc., 2000 MT 34, ¶ 41, 298 Mont. 213, 994 P.2d 1124 (distinguishing tortious interference with contractual relations). Here, as correctly concluded by the District Court, AMS acted lawfully within its contract rights regarding TimeTracker and did not impede or interfere with Ruff’s ability to independently market TimeTracker, either to existing AMS clients or to new clients.


(Montana Supreme Court, July 24, 2018, Associated Management Services, Inc. v. Ruff, Case Number DA 17-0102, Cit. 2018 MT 182, J. Sandefur)


Affaire jugée en application du droit de l’état du Montana.

Notion d’ingérence illicite dans les relations d’affaire d’un tiers, dans le but de lui porter préjudice, et lui causant effectivement un dommage.