Import: Section 337:
Trademark:
Registered mark,
Common-law mark:
Secondary meaning:
Word mark:
Product-packaging trade dress: Product-design trade dress:
Restatement (Third)
of Unfair Competition:
Appeal from the
United States International Trade Commission in Investigation No. 337-TA-936.
Section 337 provides
a remedy at the ITC for, among other things, “the importation into the United
States, the sale for importation, or the sale within the United States after
importation by the owner, importer, or consignee, of articles that infringe a
valid and enforceable United States trademark registered under the Trademark Act
of 1946.” 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(C). On October 14, 2014, Converse filed a
complaint with the ITC alleging violations of section 337 by various
respondents in the importation into the United States, the sale for
importation, and the sale within the United States after importation of shoes
that infringe its trademark. The ITC instituted an investigation on November
17, 2014.
(…) It is confusing and
inaccurate to refer to two separate marks—a registered mark and a common-law
mark. Rather, there is a single mark, as to which different rights attach from the
common law and from federal registration. E.g., In re Int’l
Flavors & Fragrances Inc., 183 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“The
federal registration of a trademark does not create an exclusive property right
in the mark. The owner of the mark already has the property right established by
prior use . . . . However, those trademark owners who register their marks with
the [Patent and Trademark Office (‘PTO’)] are afforded additional protection
not provided by the common law.”); In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 501 (CCPA 1961) (“The Lanham
Act does not create trademarks.
While it may create some new
substantive rights in trademarks, unless the trademarks pre-exist there is nothing to be registered.
Neither does it create
ownership, but only evidence thereof.”); J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 19:3 (5th ed. 2017 &
Supp. 2018).
(…) All trademarks, in order to be valid or protectable, must be
distinctive of a product’s source, and “courts have held that a mark can be
distinctive in one of two ways.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc.,
529 U.S. 205, 210 (2000). “First, a mark is inherently distinctive if ‘its intrinsic
nature serves to identify a particular source.’” Id. (quoting Two
Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992)).
“Second, a mark has acquired distinctiveness, even if it is not inherently distinctive,
if it has developed secondary meaning, which occurs when, ‘in the minds of the
public, the primary significance of a mark is to identify the source of the product
rather than the product itself.’” (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs.,
Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.11 (1982)); see also 15 U.S.C. §
1052(f).
(…) The Supreme Court has held that unlike word marks and
product-packaging trade dress, product design trade dress can never be
inherently distinctive. Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 216. As a result, “a
product’s design is distinctive, and therefore protectable, only upon a showing
of secondary meaning.” Id. Accordingly, Converse must show that its mark
has acquired distinctiveness, i.e., secondary meaning.
(…) Because the relevant date is so important to the secondary- meaning
analysis, we find that a specific determination of secondary meaning as of the
relevant date must be made. In any infringement action, the party asserting trade-dress
protection must establish that its mark had acquired secondary meaning before
the first infringing use by each alleged infringer. See, e.g., Braun,
Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 975 F.2d 815, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding
that “a claim of trade dress infringement fails if secondary meaning did not
exist before the infringement began” and placing the burden of proof on the
plaintiff); McCarthy, supra, § 16:34 (noting that the purported “senior
user must prove the existence of secondary meaning in its mark at the time and
place that the junior user first began use of that mark” and collecting cases);
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 19 cmt. b. (Am. Law Inst. 1995
& Supp. 2018). In this respect, Converse argues that it is entitled to rely
on the presumption of validity afforded to registered marks. We do not agree that
this presumption applies to infringement that began before registration.
(…) For infringement in the period after registration, the Lanham Act
entitles the owner of the registered mark to a presumption that the mark is
valid, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1057(b), 1115(a), including that it has acquired
secondary Meaning.
(…) We conclude that Converse’s registration confers a presumption of
secondary meaning beginning only as of the date of registration and confers no
presumption of secondary meaning before the date of registration. Thus, with
respect to infringement by those respondents whose first uses came before the
registration (including all of the intervenors), Converse must establish
without the benefit of the presumption that its mark had acquired secondary meaning
before the first infringing use by each respondent.
(…) Secondary meaning determination: (“To determine whether a mark has
acquired secondary meaning, courts consider: advertising expenditures and sales
success; length and exclusivity of use; unsolicited media coverage; copying of
the mark by the defendant; and consumer studies.”) (…) Consumer studies
(linking the name to a source). Today we
clarify that the considerations to be assessed in determining whether a mark
has acquired secondary meaning can be described by the following six factors:
(1) association of the trade dress with a particular source by actual
purchasers (typically measured by customer surveys); (2) length, degree, and
exclusivity of use; (3) amount and manner of advertising; (4) amount of sales and
number of customers; (5) intentional copying; and (6) unsolicited media
coverage of the product embodying the mark.
Next, we address the significance of the trademark owner’s and third
parties’ prior uses of the mark. We conclude that the ITC relied too heavily on
prior uses long predating the first infringing uses and the date of
registration. The secondary meaning analysis primarily seeks to determine what
is in the minds of consumers as of the relevant date. (…) The most relevant
evidence will be the trademark owner’s and third parties’ use in the recent period
before first use or infringement.
Secondary authorities: J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks
and Unfair Competition, § 19:3 (5th ed. 2017 & Supp. 2018); Louis
Altman & Malla Pollack, Callmann on Unfair Competition, Trademarks
and Monopolies § 26:101 (4th ed. 2012 & Supp. 2018).
(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Oct. 30, 2018,
Converse, Inc. v. ITC, Docket No. 16-2497, Circuit Judge Dyk)
La présente procédure initiée sous l’angle de la Section 337
discute :
- la distinction entre marque découlant de la Common law et marque
enregistrée, les deux ne formant qu’une seule marque, à laquelle différents
droits sont attachés, par l’opération de la Common law et par l’opération de
l’enregistrement respectivement.
- la marque qui est distinctive de manière inhérente, en ce qu’elle sert
à identifier une source particulière, et la marque qui n’est pas distinctive de
manière inhérente mais qui a développé son caractère distinct par le fait que
dans l’esprit du public, elle identifie la source du produit plutôt que le
produit lui-même (on parle dans ce second cas d’une marque qui a développé une
signification secondaire).
Au contraire d’une marque verbale ou au contraire d’une marque de nature
« product-packaging trade dress », la marque « product design
trade dress » ne peut jamais être distinctive de manière inhérente.
Dans toutes actions en violation du droit à la marque, le demandeur doit
établir la date à laquelle la marque a acquis « secondary meaning »,
et cette date doit être antérieure à la première violation. Mais dès
l’enregistrement s’applique la présomption de validité de la marque, et la
présomption d’acquisition de « secondary meaning ».
L’avant-dernier paragraphe ci-dessus donne une liste très complète des
facteurs à considérer pour déterminer si la marque a ou non acquis
« secondary meaning ». Six facteurs sont décrits.
