Habeas: Federal habeas corpus review:
"second-guess the reasonable decisions of state courts",
"clearly established Federal law": in this habeas case, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit set aside two 29-year-old murder
convictions based on the flimsiest of rationales. The court’s decision is a
textbook example of what the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (AEDPA) proscribes: “using federal habeas corpus review as a vehicle to
second-guess the reasonable decisions of state courts.” Renico v. Lett,
559 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 12). We therefore grant the petition
for certiorari and reverse; as we explained in correcting an identical error by
the Sixth Circuit two Terms ago, see Renico,
559 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 11–12), circuit precedent does not constitute
“clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court,” 28 U. S.
C. §2254(d)(1). It therefore cannot form the basis for habeas relief under
AEDPA. Nor can the Sixth Circuit’s reliance on its own precedents be defended
in this case on the ground that they merely reflect what has been “clearly
established” by our cases (U.S.S.Ct., 11.06.12, Parker v. Matthews, Per Curiam).
Showing posts with label Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. Show all posts
Monday, June 11, 2012
Parker v. Matthews
Tuesday, November 8, 2011
Greene v. Fisher
Habeas relief: federal habeas relief: clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States includes only this Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant
state-court adjudication on the merits; then sought federal habeas relief.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a
federal court may not grant such relief to a state prisoner on any claim that
has been “adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” unless that
adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1); under
§2254(d)(1), “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States” includes only this Court’s decisions as of the time
of the relevant state-court adjudication on the merits. The Court’s decision
last Term in Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U. S. ___, established
that §2254(d)(1)’s “backwardlooking language requires an examination of the
state-court decision at the time it was made.” Id., at ___. As the Court
explained in Cullen, §2254(d)(1) requires federal courts to measure
state-court decisions “against this Court’s precedents as of ‘the time the
state court renders its decision.’ ” Id., at ___. That reasoning
determines the result here; because the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s
decision—the last state-court adjudication on the merits of Greene’s
claim—predated Gray by nearly three months, the Third Circuit correctly
held that Gray was not “clearly established Federal law” against which
it could measure the state-court decision. It therefore correctly concluded
that the state court’s decision neither was “contrary to,” nor “involved an
unreasonable application of,” any “clearly established Federal law.” (U.S.S.Ct.,
08.11.11, Greene v. Fisher, J. Scalia, unanimous).
Procédure
d’habeas fédéral : précisions sur la question de droit fédéral clairement
établi, selon les déterminations de la Cour Suprême fédérale : ce droit
fédéral clairement établi ne comprend que la jurisprudence de la Cour Suprême
rendue avant que ne soit rendu le dernier jugement étatique. Ainsi, pour
déterminer si les Tribunaux des états ont appliqué le droit fédéral clairement
établi, la Cour Suprême fédérale ne prend en compte que sa jurisprudence rendue
au jour du dernier jugement étatique statuant au fond. Dans cette affaire, la
Cour Suprême fédérale ne prend pas en compte une de ses décisions rendue trois
mois après le dernier jugement étatique au fond pour déterminer rétrospectivement
si le dernier Tribunal étatique à rendre une décision s’est conformé au droit
fédéral clairement établi.
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