Horne v. Flores

Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974 (EEOA), which requires States to take “appropriate action to overcome language barriers” in schools, 20 U. S. C. §1703(f) ; Rule 60(b)(5), which permits a party to seek relief from a judgment or order if “a significant change either in factual conditions or in law” renders continued enforcement “detrimental to the public interest,” Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U. S. 367, 384, serves a particularly important function in “institutional reform litigation,” id., at 380; injunctions of this sort may also raise sensitive federalism concerns, which are heightened when, as in these cases, a federal-court decree has the effect of dictating state or local budget priorities; because of these features of institutional reform litigation, federal courts must take a “flexible approach” to Rule 60(b)(5) motions brought in this context, Rufo, supra, at 381, ensuring that “responsibility for discharging the State’s obligations is returned promptly to the State and its officials” when circumstances warrant, Frew, supra, at 442; thus, a critical question in this Rule 60(b)(5) inquiry is whether the EEOA violation underlying the 2000 order has been remedied. If it has, the order’s continued enforcement is unnecessary and improper; the Court of Appeals attributed undue significance to petitioners’ failure to appeal the District Court’s 2000 order and in doing so, failed to engage in the flexible changed circumstances inquiry prescribed by Rufo; but satisfaction of an earlier judgment is only one of Rule 60(b)(5)’s enumerated bases for relief. Petitioners could obtain relief on the independent basis that prospective enforcement of the order was “no longer equitable.” To determine the merits of this claim, the Court of Appeals should have ascertained whether the 2000 order’s ongoing enforcement was supported by an ongoing EEOA violation. Although the EEOA requires a State to take “appropriate action,” it entrusts state and local authorities with choosing how to meet this obligation. By focusing solely on ELL incremental funding, the Court of Appeals misapprehended this mandate. And by requiring petitioners to demonstrate “appropriate action” through a particular funding mechanism, it improperly substituted its own policy judgments for those of the state and local officials entrusted with the decisions; Nogales’ superintendent instituted significant structural and management reforms which, among other things, reduced class sizes, improved student/teacher ratios, and improved the quality of teachers. Entrenched in the incremental funding framework, the lower courts failed to recognize that these changes may have brought Nogales’ ELL programming into compliance with the EEOA even without sufficient incremental funding to satisfy the 2000 order. This was error (U.S.S.Ct., 25.06.09, Horne v. Flores, J. Alito).

Loi fédérale de 1974 sur des opportunités égales dans l’éducation : impose aux états d’entreprendre ce qui est nécessaire pour dépasser les barrières linguistiques à l’école. En l’espèce, un décret rendu par une cour fédérale (visant à mettre une école en conformité avec la loi de 1974) influençait les priorités budgétaires locales (posant ainsi un problème sensible de fédéralisme). Une loi de procédure permet à une partie au litige de requérir la modification d’un tel décret lorsque les faits ou la loi ont changé. Dite partie obtiendra gain de cause si elle peut démontrer que continuer d’exécuter le décret est contraire à l’intérêt public. En l’espèce, le superintendant de l’école a entrepris des réformes structurelles et managériales significatives qui ont entre autres eu comme effets la réduction de la taille des classes, l’amélioration du ratio étudiant/enseignant, et l’amélioration de la qualité des enseignants. Par conséquent, une approche souple de la loi de procédure précitée permet de conclure que l’école a satisfait à ses obligations selon la loi de 1974, même si le subventionnement incrémental requis par le décret n’a pas été amélioré. Les autres mesures entreprises suffisent à juger que l’école est désormais en conformité avec la loi de 1974.