Taxation: Tax Injunction Act (TIA), which prohibits
lower federal courts from restraining “the assessment, levy or collection of
any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had
in the courts of such State,” 28 U. S. C. §1341; comity doctrine, which
restrains federal courts from entertaining claims that risk disrupting state
tax administration, see Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn., Inc. v. McNary,
454 U. S. 100; under the comity doctrine, a taxpayer’s complaint of allegedly
discriminatory state taxation, even when framed as a request to increase a
competitor’s tax burden, must proceed originally in state court; when economic
legislation does not employ classifications subject to heightened scrutiny or
impinge on fundamental rights, courts generally view constitutional challenges
with the skepticism due respect for legislative choices demands. See, e.g.,
Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U. S. 314, 331–332. And “in taxation, even
more than in other fields, legislatures possess the greatest freedom in
classification.” Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S. 83, 88. Of key
importance, when unlawful discrimination infects tax classifications or other
legislative prescriptions, the Constitution simply calls for equal treatment.
How equality is accomplished—by extension or invalidation of the unequally
distributed benefit or burden, or some other measure—is a matter on which the
Constitution is silent. See, e.g., Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U. S.
728, 740; this Court, upon finding impermissible discrimination in a State’s
tax measure, generally remands the case, leaving the interim remedial choice to
state courts. See, e.g., McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic
Beverages and Tobacco, Fla. Dept. of Business Regulation, 496 U. S. 18,
39–40 (U.S.S.Ct., 01.06.10, Levin v. Commerce Energy, J. Ginsburg).
Tuesday, June 1, 2010
Levin v. Commerce Energy
Subscribe to:
Post Comments (Atom)
No comments:
Post a Comment