McDonald v. Chicago

Bill of rights: incorporation: The Bill of Rights, including the Second Amendment, originally applied only to the Federal Government, not to the States, see, e.g., Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243, 247, but the constitutional Amendments adopted in the Civil War’s aftermath fundamentally altered the federal system. Four years after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, this Court held in the Slaughter-House Cases, that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects only those rights “which owe their existence to the Federal government, its National character, its Constitution, or its laws,” 16 Wall., at 79, and that the fundamental rights predating the creation of the Federal Government were not protected by the Clause, id., at 76. Under this narrow reading, the Court held that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects only very limited rights. Id., at 79–80. Subsequently, the Court held that the Second Amendment applies only to the Federal Government in Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, Presser, 116 U. S. 252, and Miller, 153 U. S. 535, the decisions on which the Seventh Circuit relied in this case; Justice Black championed the alternative theory that §1 of the Fourteenth Amendment totally incorporated all of the Bill of Rights’ provisions, see, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 71– 72 (Black, J., dissenting), but the Court never has embraced that theory (U.S. S. Ct., 28.06.10, McDonald v. Chicago, J. Alito).

Incorporation du Bill of Rights : le Bill of Rights, y compris le Deuxième Amendement, ne s’appliquait à l’origine qu’au gouvernement fédéral, et non aux états. Mais les Amendements adoptés après la guerre civile ont fondamentalement modifié le système fédéral. Quatre ans après l’adoption du Quatorzième Amendement, la Cour a jugé, dans les décisions Slaughter-House Cases, que la Clause Privilèges et Immunités ne protégeait que les droits qui ne devaient leur existence qu’au gouvernement fédéral, qu’à son caractère national, à sa Constitution ou à ses lois, et que les droits fondamentaux antérieurs à la création du gouvernement fédéral n’étaient pas protégés par dite clause. Selon cette lecture restrictive, la Cour jugea que la Clause ne protégeait qu’un nombre très limité de droits. Justice Hugo Black soutenait que le §1 du Quatorzième Amendement incorporait l’ensemble du Bill of Rights, mais la Cour n’a jamais retenu cette conception.