American Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut

Common law and Clean Air Act: the Clean Air Act and the EPA action the Act authorizes displace any federal common-law right to seek abatement of carbon dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired power plants; since Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 78, recognized that there “is no federal general common law,” a new federal common law has emerged for subjects of national concern. When dealing “with air and water in their ambient or interstate aspects, there is a federal common law.” Milwaukee I, 406 U. S., at 103. Decisions of this Court predating Erie, but compatible with the emerging distinction between general common law and the new federal common law, have approved federal common-law suits brought by one State to abate pollution emanating from another State. See, e.g., Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U. S. 208, 241–243. The plaintiffs contend that their right to maintain this suit follows from such cases. But recognition that a subject is meet for federal law governance does not necessarily mean that federal courts should create the controlling law. The Court need not address the question whether, absent the Clean Air Act and the EPA actions it authorizes, the plaintiffs could state a federal common-law claim for curtailment of greenhouse gas emissions because of their contribution to global warming. Any such claim would be displaced by the federal legislation authorizing EPA to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions; “When Congress addresses a question previously governed by a decision rested on federal common law the need for such an unusual exercise of law-making by federal courts disappears.” Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U. S. 304, 314 (Milwaukee II). Legislative displacement of federal common law does not require the “same sort of evidence of a clear and manifest congressional purpose” demanded for preemption of state law. Id., at 317. Rather, the test is simply whether the statute “speaks directly to the question” at issue. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U. S. 618, 625. Here, Massachusetts made plain that emissions of carbon dioxide qualify as air pollution subject to regulation under the Clean Air Act. 549 U. S., at 528–529. And it is equally plain that the Act “speaks directly” to emissions of carbon dioxide from the defendants’ plants. The Act directs EPA to establish emissions standards for categories of stationary sources that, “in the Administrator’s judgment,” “cause, or contribute significantly to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” §7411(b)(1)(A). Once EPA lists a category, it must establish performance standards for emission of pollutants from new or modified sources within that category, §7411(b)(1)(B), and, most relevant here, must regulate existing sources within the same category, §7411(d). The Act also provides multiple avenues for enforcement. If EPA does not set emissions limits for a particular pollutant or source of pollution, States and private parties may petition for a rulemaking on the matter, and EPA’s response will be reviewable in federal court. See §7607(b)(1).The Act itself thus provides a means to seek limits on emissions of carbon dioxide from domestic power plants—the same relief the plaintiffs seek by invoking federal common law. There is no room for a parallel track; the critical point is that Congress delegated to EPA the decision whether and how to regulate carbondioxide emissions from power plants; the delegation displaces federal common law (U.S.S.Ct., 20.06.11, American Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, J. Ginsburg).

Common law et loi fédérale sur la protection de l’air : cette loi fédérale et les actes qu’elle autorise émanant de l’agence fédérale pour la protection de l’environnement (EPA) ne laissent aucune place à un droit déduit de la Common law fédérale d’ordonner une réduction des émissions de dioxyde de carbone provenant de l’industrie produisant de l’énergie ; il n’existe pas de Common law fédérale générale. Depuis que ce principe a été posé par la Cour, une nouvelle Common law fédérale a émergé dans le cadre des sujets de préoccupation nationale. Lorsqu’il s’agit de gérer des questions en rapport avec la qualité de l’air et de l’eau, il existe une Common law fédérale. Quand le Congrès fédéral règle une question préalablement régie par une décision de justice fondée sur la Common law fédérale, les cours fédérales ne peuvent modifier la législation du Congrès. Une telle modification législative de la Common law fédérale ne demande pas le même type de preuve de l’existence d’un but clair et manifeste du Congrès fédéral, comme dans les cas où il s’agit de savoir si le droit fédéral l’emporte sur le droit étatique. Le test consiste simplement à se demander si la loi fédérale adresse directement la question en jeu.

(Le reste de la décision explique le processus par lequel l’EPA réglemente les limites de pollution). La loi fédérale sur la protection de l’air prévoit des moyens pour faire respecter des limites à l’émission de dioxyde de carbone émanant d’entreprises du secteur de l’énergie. Il n’existe ainsi pas de voie parallèle découlant de la Common law fédérale. Le point décisif est que le Congrès a délégué à l’EPA la compétence de décider quand et comment réguler les émissions de dioxyde de carbone émanant des entreprises du secteur de l’énergie. Cette délégation de compétence ne laisse pas place à la Common law fédérale.