CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride

Causation: Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA); in accord with FELA’s text and purpose, Rogers, and the uniform view of the federal appellate courts, that FELA does not incorporate stock “proximate cause” standards developed in nonstatutory common-law tort actions. The charge proper in FELA cases simply tracks the language Congress employed, informing juries that a defendant railroad “caused or contributed to” a railroad worker’s injury “if the railroad’s negligence played a part—no matter how small—in bringing about the injury.” That, indeed, is the test Congress prescribed for proximate causation in FELA cases; given FELA’s “broad” causation language, Urie v. Thompson, 337 U. S. 163, 181, and Congress’ “humanitarian” and “remedial goals” in enacting the statute, FELA’s causation standard is “relaxed” compared to that applicable in common-law tort litigation, Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Gottshall, 512 U. S. 532, 542–543. Rogers described that relaxed standard as “whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought.” 352 U. S., at 506. Because the District Court’s instruction tracked Rogers’ language, the instruction was plainly proper so long as Rogers actually prescribes the causation definition applicable under FELA. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 172 (U.S.S.Ct., 23.06.11, CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, J. Ginsburg).

Notion de causalité dans la loi fédérale sur la responsabilité de l’employeur fédéral pour les dommages causés aux employés (FELA). La causalité adéquate, autrement applicable dans les affaires de responsabilité civile ordinaire (torts) ne s’applique pas ici. Il suffit que la négligence de l’employeur, même minime, ait joué un rôle dans la survenance du préjudice. C’est dans ce sens que doit être instruit le jury s’agissant des affaires jugées sous l’autorité de la loi fédérale précitée.